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Central Europe in the Rokkanian Perspective 
Wisla Surazska∗ 
Abstract: Various theoretical perspectives an political 
developments in post-communist Central Europe are 
considered. The paradigm of modernisation and democratic 
theory are funnd insufficient to explain such phenomena as 
the renewal of ethno-regional identities, that are typical of 
the region and sometimes lead to irredentism and secession. 
lt is argued, that these phenomena can be better understood 
in the context of Rokkan's conceptions of state and nation 
building. Rokkan's theory an the critical junctures in history 
is tested an the retum of Polish parliamentary election in 
1991. The map of the turnout in this elections is produced, 
showing the lines of the Third Partition (1795-1919) in the 
contemporary electoral behaviour. Other examples of the 
re-integration of historic regions are offered as well and the 
consequences of this development are discussed. 
 
While studying the dynamics of political integration in West European 
societies, Stein Rokkan was convinced, already at the end of the seventies, that 
the most persistent paradigm of social sciences about the diminishing 
significance of territorial boundaries within modern societies had already been 
"shaken to the core" (Rokkan & Urwin 1983:117). He understood how 
complex entities the modern, developed societies were with their several layers 
of identity, such as a city, a region, an ethnic group. The fact that those various 
layers "are historically derived" he wrote, "does not necessarily make them 
anachronistic, without relevance to the modern industrial world" (Ibid.: 119). 
Rokkan pointed, as early as the mid seventies, to four countries as dubious 
cases of social integration: Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Italy and Belgium. 
                                                          
∗  Address all communications to Wisla Surazska, Institute of Comparative Politics, 
University of Bergen, Christiesgt. 15, N-5007 Bergen, Norway. 
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227 
It seems though that Rokkan underestimated the resilience of the paradigm 
of modernisation in social sciences. The real shock came only with the 
breakdown of communist regimes. These regimes were the testing grounds for 
modernisation theory. Such objectives as industrialisation, urbanisation, mass 
education and secularisation of society were the prime items an the agenda of 
communist governments and they were implemented with the lightning speed. 
But the significance of territorial boundaries (ethnic, religious, historic, 
cultural) within post-communist societies has by no means decreased. Ort the 
contrary, as soon as the corset of coercion was lifted, ethno-territorial lines of 
division have become more distinct than any other cleavages (O'Loughlin, 
1993). 
Research an electoral returns in East-Central Europe have shown the 
increasing significance of territorial cleavages that can be traced back to the 
period prior to the war. In the last Czechoslovak parliamentary elections of 
1992, the only all-national party were the former Communists. The two 
winners, ODS and HZDS drew their support separately from the Czech lands 
or Slovakia. Within the Czech lands themselves, the regions of Moravia and 
Silesia gave as much support to the local party (HSD-SMS) as to the winning 
ODS of Vaclav Klauss. The same phenomenon occurred in Slovakia in the 
southern districts with the substantial Hungarian minority (Kostelecki 1992, 
Jehlicka et al 1993). In Hungary, the pre-war cleavage between east and West 
of the Danube was still present in the electoral returns of 1990 (Martis at al 
1992). In the first democratic elections to the Polish Sejm in 1989, the 
geography of electoral turn-out recreated the century long differences between 
the traditional regions of Galicja, Wielkopolska and the Congress Poland, the 
territorial entities that had ceased to exist more than 70 years ago (Florczyk at 
al 1990). 
In this context, the first question to be considered is: how modern were 
communist societies? The second question concerns theoretical instruments 
offered by modern social sciences for studies on post-communist societies. The 
first two sections of this paper will deal with those questions in turn. In further 
sections 1 shall try to show that Rokkan's perspective might be most fruitful in 
research on post-communist transition 
How modern were communist societies? 
In the special issue of National Interest on the "Strange Death of Soviet 
Communism", Fukujama reprimanded sovietologists for developing their own 
models and methods apart from the paradigms of modern social sciences 
(Fukujama, 1993). Had they been more familiar with modernization theory and 
the collateral models of political development, he wrote, the students of 
communist regimes would have a better chance to understand what was
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happening in the Soviet Union. Such phenomena as the diffusion of power 
from the Soviet centre to the Party's lower reaches, the growing significance of 
industrial managers and academics, even the growth of "mafias" inside and 
outside the Party were all but typical facets of a "proto-civil society". In that, 
Fukujama says, the Soviet Union falls into the same category as other countries 
that have made recent transition from an agricultural economy to a modern 
industrial one and have to cope with the vicissitudes of modernity. 
However, the output of the Soviet studies for the last two decades shows, 
that modernization theory was effectively forcing out the theory of 
totalitarianism as the flagship model of the area1. Communist politics was 
combed in order to find evidence for such phenomena as institutionalisation, 
managerialism, the formation of interest groups etc.2. The Western political 
scientists were often helped in their efforts by the modern-thinking section of 
the Soviet establishment, who considered finding the ills typical of Western 
modernity inside the Soviet Union quite reassuring. Since the result was more 
confusion rather than less one may think that perhaps some paradigms of social 
sciences referred to by Fukujama have been wanting not less than the 
indigenous models produced by sovietologists themselves. 
Modernization theory is a paradigm rather than a theory of an exact content. 
Indeed, the notion of a paradigm is too narrow for the idea which itself gave 
birth to social sciences. Such disciplines as economics and sociology owe their 
existence to the intellectual discovery of changes taking place in Britain and 
France at the turn of Eighteenth and Nineteenth century (Binder, 1971). The 
idea of transition from traditional to modern economy, society and culture had 
soon turned into a powerful ideology with its own impact an both social 
sciences and political developments. In the classic version of the paradigm, the 
process of modernization was either a by-product of actions undertaken by the 
rational individuals (invisible hand of classical economics) or it was directed 
by transcendental forces (historical dialectics) beyond individual control. In 
both cases, the modernizing outcome was not intended and politics was merely 
adapting to the economic and social changes. That was roughly the way to 
explain the subsequent stages of Western European development from the 
traditional, rigidly stratified society to a more mobile, modern one with all the 
political consequences that followed. 
Later on, modernization paradigm responded to the demand from belated 
modernizers in their quest for beneficial changes already obtained in Western 
Europe. Thus the subsequent models assumed that economic and social
                                                          
1  It originated with Barrington Moore's Terror and Progress, USSR (Cambridge, 
MA:Harvard University Press, 1954) and practically dominated the production of the field 
since the appearance of J.F.Triska and P.M.Cocks (eds.) Political Development in 
Eastern Europe, New York:Praeger, 1977. 
2 For a comprehensive review see: G.A. Almond with L. Roselle, »Model Fitting in 
communist studies«, in: Politics and the Soviet System, McMillan, 1989. 
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transition to modernity might by planned, directed and brought about by a 
government. Prescriptions for modernization multiplied in the fifties and sixties 
when the demand was particularly high in the post-colonial world and 
developmental models were put on the political agenda. Industrialisation was 
the prime item, not only for the sake of economic development but also in 
order to facilitate social transition. The rise of urban proletariat in the 
predominantly peasant societies was seen as a necessary social base for modern 
development. 
The modernizing function of Marxist regimes was taken for granted. After 
all, industrialization, urbanization, mass education and secularization of society 
as well as other items of modernity were the prime issues an their agenda. 
Indeed, some authors saw the Leninist party as the only practical solution to the 
problems of belated modernization. That democracy may become a hindrance 
rather than precondition to late modernization was already suggested by several 
theories of political development. In the sixties, Huntington summarized the 
experience of post-colonial development in the unequivocal alternative: ". . . 
the non-Western countries of today can have political modernization or they 
can have democratic pluralism, but they cannot normally have both" 
(Huntington 1968:138). 
A closer examination of the institutional landscape left behind by 
communist regimes should have given a pause to those who saw communist 
parties as the agents of modernity. Indeed, as far as institutions go, the 
communist period resulted with "de-modernization" in most of the countries 
concerned. Post-communist transition has largely consisted of the recovery of 
pre-communist financial and administrative institutions sought after as the lost 
threads of modernization. In the Czech Republic, the pre-war Katastral Offices 
were resumed only in January 1993 to keep the record of land holdings and 
they must cope with the consequences of former regime's practices of granting 
unrecorded and frequently informal property titles. In Poland, attempts have 
been made to restore the pre-war local lending and saving associations (KKO), 
so far without much success. 
If the forces in work on both sides of the Iron Curtain were essentially similar or 
equivalent in their modernizing impact, how to explain the results so disparate? 
There is a conspicuous adversity between the idea of modern society as 
presumed and practiced by Marxist modernises on the one hand, and the 
empirical features of developed societies an the other. In the Marxist tradition, 
social development anticipated a simplification of societal structures up to the 
elimination of the most persistent modern division into classes. Such idea of 
social progress informed the policies of communist governments. Communist 
take-overs resulted with the destruction of the existing societal structures by 
means of wholesale nationalisation. The unmixed content of mass media 
further enhanced the appearances of social homogeneity. The empirical 
sociology has shown, however, that developed societies don't become simpler
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in their structures but more complex. Indeed, the more developed society the 
more complex it becomes: "There will be more groups, more classes, more 
occupations, more structures, more roles - and more conflict" (Binder 1971). 
The absence of a complete array of classes, statuses, social groupings etc. has 
been considered as tantamount to the absence of civil society. 
The point of contention is therefore whether the modern social 
differentiation had in fact developed under communist regimes despite their 
ideological commitment and political interest in preventing the expression of 
group interests. To be sure, neither the pre-existing social differentiation could 
possibly be eliminated without a trace nor the most severe repression and 
indoctrination could eradicate all economic transactions outside the oficial 
framework of redistribution. A shrude observer of the Ukrainian culture 
described how the ever present threat of Mongol intrusions shaped the manners 
of local trade. Merchants displayed their goods in such a way as to be able to 
pull up their business on a blow of a whistle and disappear in the nearby 
bushes. The same manner of trading could be observed in Ukraine under the 
Soviet rule (Stempowski, 1992). 
Moreover, communist leaderships were in the Business of government and 
that could not be done without a rudimentary organization, delegation of 
powers, giving some groups a better access to goods and privileges than to 
others etc. (Kaminski, 1992). All that created in turn a certain type of social 
stratification, various entrenched interests and countervailing centres to defend 
them. In particular, the late communist regime was incapable of an effective 
control over its own territorial administrations. All the same, the defective 
centralisation did not translate itself into pluralism as some observers of Soviet 
politics had it. 
The ability to stage a protest has been pointed out as the prime feature of 
modernity, a proof of the existence of civil society under communist regimes. 
However, the form in which communist societies protested was indicative of 
something to the contrary. The contagious quality of such discontents, if not 
immediately suppressed by force, derived from the lack of modern social 
divisions that might have counter-balanced each other's interests. In this sense, 
the ten-million Solidarity union emerging overnight and almost without 
warning cannot be an indication of the existence of civil society but rather of 
it's conspicuous scarcity. 
Communist societies were not class societies, neither in Marxist nor in 
Weberian sense both referring to market and property relations. Even in 
Poland, the country most often pointed to as the example of a civil society 
simmering under the pressure of the communist regime, more systematic 
research found that the only two structures attracting individual loyalties were 
"family" and "nation" with a peculiar vacuum in between, that is, in the space 
designated for the structures of civil society (Nowak, 1975). 
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The Western experience has shown yet another and perhaps more important 
function of civil society than staging a protest, namely its role in bringing about 
political integration. The dominant theme of sociological research and theory - 
from Tonnies and Weber to Rokkan and Lipset concerned the changing social 
cleavages and commitments that pull the individuals out of their primordial 
local-ethnic and kinship ties and integrate them into modern, nation-wide, 
interconnected networks of interests and structures (Lipset Rokkan 1967:1-63). 
Rokkan's studies in particular demonstrated that political integration of modern 
societies is based to a large extent an class and other functional cleavages 
cutting across the more traditional ones, such as religious, ethnic or regional 
(Rokkan 1967:368-440). His theory received a peculiar confirmation a rebour 
after the collapse of communist regimes. As a result of the lack of modern, 
functional divisions, post communist societies tend to crumble along ethno-
territorial lines. The same dearth of vertical social structures has been pointed 
to as the major break an the development of mass political parties in the post-
communist era (Staniszkis 1991). The phenomenon of communist leaderships 
swept from power by the overwhelming majorities in the First elections only to 
return with narrow pluralities in the next one, is another indication of the want 
of modern cleavages that would facilitate the development of mass political 
parties capable of challenging the remnants of the former ruling elites and 
organisations. 
Democratic theory and territorial retrenchment 
The First surge of the literature on postcommunist transition concentrated an 
the nascent democratic institutions and developing markets. These are typical 
issues for democratic theory to deal with, according to the understanding of 
democracy as a redistributive mechanism. It helps us to understand the way in 
which the wealth is distributed and institutional constraints are challenged in 
the established democracies, with defined boundaries, entrenched institutions, 
operating markets and social structures already in place. It seems less helpful, 
however, in approaching the processes of institution building and the major, 
almost revolutionary, changes of societal structures. 
Democratic theory does not address the issue of state making and political 
integration as processes with their own dynamics nor can it handle the problem 
of territorial tensions generated by these processes. Such phenomena as 
irredentism and secession are beyond the grasp of the leading paradigms of 
social sciences and therefore they are consigned to the sphere of irrational 
incidents or peculiarities of a "political culture". This means that they are of no 
relevance to the mainstream models. Since territorial tensions are the leading 
phenomena of the post communist world, to understand them we must go to 
Rokkan rather than to Dahl. 
From the Rokkanian perspective, East-Central Europe is in the process of 
territorial retrenchment; a large territorial system broke up and the former
232 
peripheries consolidate around their own historic centres. There are many 
constraints coming from historic legacies latent in the region. But there is also 
little doubt that Central Europe is undergoing the major turn in its history, a 
turn which itself will produce important consequences for the future. As 
Rokkan noted: "In the history of the territorial structuring of political systems, 
it is as important to analyse the process of retrenchment as it is to study the 
phases of expansion" (Rokkan 1970:77). 
In such a perspective, post-communist transition means the acquisition of a 
new status by the former peripheries, the process by no means harmonious and 
fully predictable. The split up of Czechoslovakia has already shown that, under 
the new circumstances, there is nothing given in the maintenance of the central 
status by any particular site. To do so, the resources are needed not only 
economic but also political and cultural and the new democratic governments 
may find them in short supply. Thus the new democratic regimes in East-
Central Europe are being established in a contest of centripetal and centrifugal 
forces and with all the challenges to the latecomers. 
The problem of timing seems crucial and it has already been described in the 
context of post-colonial state and nation building. Such problems as the 
consolidation of a political centre, effective administration of its policies and 
the maintenance of public order may appear almost intractable in societies 
embracing mass democracy without modern institutional safegards already in 
place. Rokkan pointed out that the traditional western democracies had 
managed to solve the worst problems of state and nation building in sequence. 
His model consists of four phases: (1) Administrative penetration, (2) Cultural 
standardization, (3) Participation, and (4) Redistribution. Thus in the successful 
ventures of building a state, the administrative machinery was already in place 
before the demands of mass democracy emerged. The welfare state usually 
came last (Rokkan 1975:562-600). In contrast, the newcomers must cope with 
all these tasks at one and the same time. Further, the new states have been 
confronted with highly successful development in the West which made the 
public even more demanding. 
All these challenges of the late state building are present again in Eastern 
Europe. In a way, the dynamics of post-communist reforms repeats the 
Rokkan's model but the other way around. The post-communist governments 
must begin with the dismantling of the overloaded mechanisms of 
redistribution, an the way they loose popular support, which results with the 
political fragmentation of the electorate and mobilisation of the periphery that 
become increasingly resistant to administrative penetration from the centre. 
There is, in fact, a marked gap between die aspirations of new democratic 
governments in East-Central Europe to maintain the unitary systems of public 
administration and their ability to do so. For the process of external territorial 
retrenchment that gave the historic "failed centres" the second (or the third?) 
chance to reinstate their sovereignty, has also activated the countervailing
233 
forces of internal retrenchment, that is, the movements for greater local and 
regional autonomy within a regime. 
Such internal retrenchment has always been an important factor in 
democratic transitions and the post-communist transition is not an exception. 
The main reason is general by nature. lt results from the fact that the former 
regime broke down and the new one is only in the process of establishing itself. 
Thus some of local elites, especially in the regions of a strong historic identity, 
try to re-negotiate their position within the newly emerging regime. The 
process of internal retrenchment may occur also at the level of municipalities. 
Demands for revision of their administrative affiliation and boundaries are 
usually followed by the demand for greater decentralisation. 
The microcosm of civil society 
Local frays over administrative sites and boundaries have usually been 
perceived as primeval tribulations typical of backward communities and 
considered by many a political scientist and policy maker irrational altogether. 
The latter's analytical predilections make them more preoccupied with general 
features of a political process rather than with its content. Such homogenising 
approach may leave behind significant political traumas not only unexplained 
but also unnoticed until it is too late to think of a remedy. 
Local aspirations do not need to involve ethnic or religious differences 
although their presence makes the conflict more dramatic. For example, the 
Czech municipalities placed an the "wrong side" of the historic border of 
Moravia by the arbitrary division of 1960 showed some symptoms of a 
"frontier mentality" in their voting patterns in 1992 national elections (Jehlicka 
at al, 1992). During the Polish debate an reinstating the intermediary units of 
powiat, one of die criteria considered was the presence of land registers in the 
town. Neighbouring towns engaged in snatching those books from each other 
and citizen's committees were called up to guard them. 
The issue of territorial boundaries remains in the heart of democratic process 
even though democratic theory tends to discard it as marginal. The degree to 
which inhabitants accept the scope of a territorial unit as an appropriate entity 
of a communal life or a distinct cultural space (i.e. a historic region) does 
matter since at the grass root democratic process expresses itself in the 
awakening of such primordial identities (Linz 1992). What is more, such 
collective identities may appear a precondition of successful democratic 
development. The importance of local "civic roots" has recently been 
demonstrated by Putnam. in his study an civic traditions in modern Italy 
(Putnam 1993). 
Putnam's discovery of territorial differences in the performance of democratic 
institutions in Italy surprised nobody. The division between the
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North and the South of the country as well as the historic antecedents of this 
division have been a common knowledge. What is new in Putnam's approach is 
that he made use of this common knowledge in systematic political studies. 
Putnam draws his theoretical perspective from more general concepts of a 
collective action and there is no reference to Rokkan's studies in his book. 
Perhaps that is why Putnam's geo-political explanations of the circumstances 
that shaped particular types of communities are more anecdotic than 
systematic. 
Rokkan's models are not easily applicable. The very preparation of a data-
base that would have met their empirical requirements may take more than the 
usual time and funds designated for a research project. Nevertheless, the effort 
of extending his conceptual map of Europe to the East, where it has some 
major gaps, seems worth taking. In the following section, some preliminary 
results of such project will be presented. The research begins with empirical 
investigation of the geo-political consequences of a complex territorial history 
of Poland. In the following section some elements of the Rokkanian concept of 
nation building find confirmation in the electoral returns in Poland. 
Territorial boundaries and mental boundaries 
The European process of mass democratisation in the turn of XIXth and XXth 
century developed within the framework of the already existing political 
institutions. In Rokkan's models both structures, that is, the existing machinery 
of government and the developing institutions of mass participation, are 
considered together in his concept of critical junctures. There are four such 
junctures in the development of European nation states in Rokkan's model: (1) 
Reformation-Counterreformation movements of XVI-XVII century, (2) 
National revolutions of post-Napoleonic era, (3) Industrial revolution of XIXth 
century, and (4) International revolution of 1917. Each of those junctures 
created a typical set of cleavages and alliances depending on circumstances 
under which they happened in particular countries. The national responses to 
those junctures have been embedded in the contemporary party systems of 
those countries (Rokkan 1970). 
Without going into details of the model, which developed into a conceptual 
map of European democracies, the important point for further consideration is 
that the national responses to each critical juncture tend to "freeze" into quite 
persistent patterns of cleavages, often territorially defined and reflected in 
contemporary party systems of particular countries. This "freezing" hypothesis 
by Rokkan coincides with the position taken by Putnam on the persistence of 
patterns of civic engagement rooted in the history of various regions (Putnam 
1993). I'm going to test this theory of "freezing" of a civic makeup as it 
emerged in the early stages of national and industrial revolution an the Polish 
electoral data from the 1991 parliamentary elections. 
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Poland is a good case to test such a theory since at the time of the 
watersheds in European nation building, the country was divided between three 
empires of diverse political cultures: Russia, Prussia and Austria-Hungary. 
After the partitions of 1773-95, the region of Wielkopolska became the eastern 
province of Prussia as the Duchy of Poznan and shared in the German 
modernisation and industrialisation drive of the mid-Nineteenth century. Now 
the region leads the process of economic transition. 
The southern part of Poland (Malopolska) went to the Habsburgs as the 
province of Galicja. The region was largely rural, dominated by a conflict 
between the peasants and landowners, skilfully manipulated by the imperial 
centre. The Galicjan peasants were turned into Poles only under the Second 
Republic and the region has remained the stronghold of the peasant movement 
until now. Densely populated villages with their closely knit communities were 
virtually impossible to penetrate for the outsiders, even under communist 
regime. It was the Galicjan village that defied Stalinist attempts at 
collectivisation. The part of Poland that was taken by Russia, the Congress 
Poland (from the Congress of Vienna in 1815) was in many ways a spearhead 
of the Russian industrialisation but also shared in the Russian political 
backwardness. After the subsequent uprisings the region lost its economic 
advantage as well as a meagre political distinctiveness from the rest of the 
Russian Empire. 
In the following section those differences in historical traditions will be 
traced in the electoral behaviour in post-communist Poland. 
In research presented below, data come from the level of municipalities. 
Making municipalities the basic units of territorial inquiry may solve the 
problem of shifting administrative and political boundaries in East Central 
Europe. Further, it makes possible to trace on the maps of electoral behaviour 
in the recent years the effects of some historic boundaries that had long 
disappeared. 
Fig. 1 shows the territorial differentiation of electoral turn-out in the Polish 
parliamentary elections of 1991 at the level of municipalities. The national 
turn-out in that election was relatively low (43.2%) one of the reasons being a 
fairly complicated voting procedure. Nevertheless, the historic boundaries 
come out quite clearly. Two sets of such boundaries seem of particular 
importance. The first are the borders of Partitions. The second are the western 
boundaries of the Second Republic (1919-1939). The effect of both sets of 
boundaries an electoral behaviour will be discussed in turn. 
The map of the electoral turn-out in 1991 in Poland recreates the boundaries 
of Partitions with the remarkable exactness. The differences between political 
cultures of the three empires seem to have "frozen" into the civic make-up of 
the respective localities for several generations. Under the Habsburgs, the 
Polish Galicja had its own elected parliament and local government. Although 
the Ukrainian minority and the peasants were heavily discriminated against, 
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Table 1. Returns from the Polish parliamentary elections 1991 and 1993. 
 
Region Mean turn- out in 1991 
Pro-reform 
vote in 1993 
Catholic vote 
in 1993 
1 Congress Poland 36,1 10,3 6,3 
2 Galicja 46,7 19,1 12,2 
3 East Prussia 34,7 17,0 4,4 
4 Wielkopolska 43,6 18,8 5,2 
5 Gdansk&Pomorze 43,1 18,7 1 7,3 
those representative institutions gave the Poles the first training in political 
participation. The results can be seen more than one hundred years later. 
Electoral turn-out in the former region of Galicja exceeds by 10% the figure 
obtained in its immediate neighbourhood to the North, which was under 
Russian sovereignty (Tab. 1). 
Similarly distinct is the boundary separating the former Congress Poland 
from the former Duchy of Poznan. What we call today "race relations" were 
bad in the Duchy of Poznan at the time of Prussian and later German 
sovereignty over the region. Max Weber, the great supporter of germanisation 
of those territories, complained about scant results brought by the policies 
applied to this effect by German authorities. The Poznan Poles were resurgent 
nationalists. Paradoxically though it was the Prussian tradition of "law and 
order", and also the ethics of hard work, that has made the region distinct later 
on. It provided the administrative class and economic managers for the 
reconstruction of the Second Polish Republic (1919 -1939), as it does in many 
ways today. 
The map of electoral turnout shows some contrasting patterns within the 
western territories of Poland, which can be traced along the western borders of 
the Polish Second Republic. To understand those contrasts, we must go back to 
the more recent history. 
The consequences of mass resettlements 
At the Potsdam Conference in 1945, the Allies conferred the territories east of 
the rivers Odder and Nissen to Poland as a compensation for her eastern lands 
already taken over by Stalin. As a result, Poland was bodily moved some 300 
km. to the West. Some 5 mln. Germans left the territories acquired by Poland 
either escaping in the front of the Red Army or deported by the new Polish 
authorities. The former East Prussia, Pomerania, East Branderburg and Lower 
Silesia became resettled by the Polish population from the parts of Ukraine, 
Belarus and Lithuania which became part of the Soviet Union. The part of
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Poland under the former Prussian-German sovereignty from the time of 
Partitions consists of two types of territories: (a) those which belonged to the 
Second Polish Republic, as the provinces of Pomorze, Wielkopolska and part 
of the Silesia province, and (b) those which became part of Poland after the 
WW II. 
The levels of electoral turn-out contrast quite clearly across both sets of 
boundaries. Territories between the western border of the Second Republic and 
the present western border of Poland differ. The civic make-up in the territories 
acquired after the W.W.II seems week as can be seen from a rather low 
electoral turn-out (37%). It would be difficult to explain this otherwise than by 
mass resettlements which affected those territories at the end of the W.W.II. 
The southern parts of Silesia and the Baltic coast, where part of indigenous 
communities (Silesians and Kashubs) avoided resettlement, the electoral turn-
out is in fact higher than in the surroundings areas, where the resettlement was 
more comprehensive. A similar phenomenon of a lower electoral turnout in the 
resettled parts of Bohemia has been discernible in the last Czechoslovak 
parliamentary elections of 19923. 
The effects of the borders of the Second Republic are particularly persistent 
in the northern territories, where the new settlements gave the communist 
authorities the widest room for their "modernising" agenda. Collectivisation of 
the agriculture that failed in the rest of the country here was relatively 
"successful", if the number of state farms is considered. Similarly, the "great 
building sites of socialism" proliferated here, bringing the masses of migrant 
workers who settled in the new housing estates, but have never integrated with 
local communities. One of the consequences of such "social engineering" is 
that those territories are lagging behind in economic transition, studded as they 
are with the municipalities built around one factory which finds itself in the 
state of decline under the new circumstances of market economy. The 
concentration of such municipalities with "structural problems" in the northern 
parts of Poland that were resettled after the war is shown on the Fig. 2. 
The new regionalism 
The main challenge in post-communist transition is coming from such environs 
of "structural poverty" formed in the rural areas dominated by large state farms 
or industrial sites that have appeared economically not viable. The electoral 
results showed that these sites might have their politically explosive potentials 
as they provide disproportional share of the votes for all kinds of political 
extremism. There is little local activism in such precincts both inhabitants and 
their elected councils looking to the centre for help. The poverty of such areas 
                                                          
3  Own data. More detailed research on the relationship between the size of resettlements and 
electoral behaviour are underway. 
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cannot be cured by means of self-government and participation because of the 
lack of communal bounds among the inhabitants. 
Ort the other hand, it is becoming quite clear that centrally directed 
economic transition has its limits. Capitalism is a grass root phenomenon which 
can be encouraged by macroeconomic policy but only up to a point. The role of 
local government in both stimulating the economic growth and providing 
protection against its side-effects has been increasing in Poland. That in turn 
may lead to the widening of territorial inequalities rather than to alleviating it. 
One of the remedies might be a diffusion of local initiatives over wider areas in 
the form of regional mobilisation. The current debate in Poland on the role of 
intermediary territorial units has been paralleled by the emergence of regional 
movements which started as cultural and social organisations and have become 
increasingly political. 
Regional associations have taken various forms, beginning with cooperation 
between the present small provinces initiated by the (state appointed) voivodes, 
to voluntary associations of local governments for economic and cultural 
purposes though with a distinct political flavour. Such associations have been 
organised by mayors of historic regional centres and cover more or less the 
territory of the old provinces that had been divided in 1975. There is also a 
vigorous regional association of Vistulan Pomerania (Pomorze Nadwislanskie) 
a new region with the centre in Gdansk. Its engine is the ethnic minority - the 
Kashubs - the descendants of a Baltic tribe decimated in the Middle Ages by 
the Teutonic Knights. Attempts to organise regional movements in other parts 
of Poland have so far failed, one of the reasons being a dramatic change of 
Polish territory after the war. A good example is Wroclaw, a natural centre of 
the Lower Silesia region, which conspicuously failed to integrate the 
surrounding provinces. 
That territorial diffusion of local initiatives has its limits in the form of the 
old boundaries still lingering in people's minds can be sin in Fig. 3. lt shows the 
membership of the Association of Wielkopolska Municipalities that covers 
more or less the territory of the former Duchy of Poznan, which at present 
consists of several administrative provinces. Fig. 3 also shows a more scattered 
pattern of another association of municipalities, the Western Union, created in 
the territories acquired by Poland after the Second World War. It should be 
mentioned that neither Wielkopolska Association nor the Western Union made 
geographic restrictions for their membership. In fact, Wielkopolska Association 
made considerable inroads in the recruitment of municipalities beyond its 
historic border to the East, that is, in the territories of little indigenous regional 
activity. It was less popular though among municipalities in the immediate 
neighbourhood to the West, where a sense of regional identity seems more 
complicated. 
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Conclusions 
Ethnic conflicts have been most frequently cited as die major source of 
centrifugal forces in East-Central Europe. In fact, the region has been notorious 
as a "belt of mixed populations" and as such considered the least suited for the 
development of unitary nation-states. Territorial tensions, however, may 
originate from the variety of other sources. For the transition means also a 
greater diversification, political, economic and cultural, across the territories 
and within the nations that for decades had been kept under tight control. Such 
diversification has been fuelled by many factors, from the very mechanics of 
the disintegrating regimes to the very nature of democratic and market reforms 
already underway. 
In this context, Poland is a particularly good example; after the last war the 
country became fairly homogeneous, at least as far as ethnicity is concerned. 
Nevertheless, die territorial differentiation of voting behaviour shows die 
persistence of certain boundaries that have long disappeared from political and 
administrative maps. Rokkan's concept of "freezing" of a civic make-up that 
had been formed in the early periods of democratic revolutions seems a good 
explanation for this phenomenon. 
The question remains open of how such patterns of civic behaviour are 
being transmitted through the generations, especially in the country of such a 
turbulent history as Poland. The reason that we do not know the exact answer 
to this question is because there is not enough research on the subject. Family 
and community traditions may provide the first set of hypotheses to explain 
such transmission. The issue requires separate studies, and perhaps can be 
better handled by the methods of social psychology than those of political 
science. 
There is another problem, however, illustrated by the maps of electoral 
behaviour in Poland that needs further research. It concerns the consequences 
of "social engineering" in the form of mass resettlements that had followed the 
change of borders after the World War II. Such resettlements were not unique 
for Poland but happened also in other countries and their social, political and 
economic consequences beg for a more comprehensive, comparative study. 
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